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Social norms and (de-)financialization: Japan’s and China’s
divergent paths in consumer credit
Fumihito Gotoh
Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT
Since the 1980s, American-led financialization promoting capital
and labour mobility has influenced Asia, but the Japanese and
Chinese trajectories in financialization of consumption (consumer
credit development) have diverged, with the 1995–2013
contraction in Japan contrasting with the skyrocketing growth in
China since 2010. I argue the divergence can be attributed to the
varying levels of compatibility between American financial norms
and their social norms, the different timings of their integration
into the global economy (the influence of ‘embedded liberalism’
or neoliberalism), and the interests of key actors of each country.
Anti-liberal Japanese elites reversed the financialization of
consumption to preserve anti-capitalistic ‘industrious norms’ and
strong attachments to intermediary organisations, which are the
cornerstones of their dominance. In contrast, economic
rationalism embedded in Chinese society since late imperial
China, when capital and labour mobility was enhanced by
removing fixed intermediary organisations considerably under







Financialization, which is defined as ‘the increasing role of financial motives, financial
markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and
international economies’ (Epstein, 2005, p. 3), is usually regarded as an Anglo-American
affair. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to consider other forms of financialization
that do not simply follow the Anglo-American ‘model’ (e.g. Gruin, 2019b; Petry, 2020;
Rethel & Thurbon, 2020; Robinson, 2017). These tend to emphasise the importance of
government intervention in enhancing the role of financial markets in the domestic
economy. This paper is a contribution to this expansion of the concept, specifically finan-
cialization of consumption, by considering two Asian approaches. It argues that to under-
stand how Japanese and Chinese (de-)financialization of consumption have evolved and
why they have evolved in different ways, we need to understand the significance of how
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social norms (i.e. informal rules about how to behave in a group or society) have
influenced the evolution of two different types of capitalism.
Widely distributed consumer credit in a society is a hallmark of financialization
(Langley, 2008). Outstanding non-mortgage consumer credit in China skyrocketed by
20-fold from 2007 to 2018, while the amount in Japan halved from 1995 to 2013, although
it recovered to some extent subsequently (Figure 1). Despite the fact that it still depends
on investment-led growth, China’s rapid consumer credit growth (financialization of con-
sumption) indicates its vibrant capitalism and consumption-driven growth policy led by
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In contrast, Japan’s de-financialization of consump-
tion reveals its anti-capitalistic social norms epitomised by private-sector companies’ pro-
vision of social security measures, for instance, keeping redundant regular workers inside
their organisations and/or shifting them to other divisions and businesses (Matsumoto,
2011, p. 224). My key argument is that anti-capitalistic ‘industrious norms’ (internalised
work ethic, respect for labour and a negative view of financial profit) and ‘systemic
support’ have made Japanese society conflictual with financialization, whereas economic
rationalism (belief in the efficiency of market economies) embedded in Chinese society
has facilitated it, and their divergent social norms are interrelated with the different
timings of their integration into the global economy (the influence of ‘embedded liberal-
ism’ or neoliberalism) and the interests of key actors of each country. I conducted 32 inter-
views for this research in Tokyo and Shanghai from 2015 to 2019. My statistical sources for
Japanese and Chinese consumer credit include the Japan Consumer Credit Association
and the People’s Bank of China. Before discussing the key concepts, let me briefly over-
view the Japanese and Chinese consumer credit markets (Figure 1).
Outstanding Japanese consumer credit nearly quadrupled from 1982 to 1995, when it
peaked, but bank loans for consumers were reduced due to the burst of the asset bubble
in the early 1990s and the financial crisis from 1995 onwards. In contrast, non-bank con-
sumer credit (mainly provided by consumer lenders) soared from 1995 until 2005 due to
the 1996 Japanese ‘Big Bang’ financial deregulation and the growing influence of
Figure 1. Historical Outstanding Amounts of Chinese and Japanese Consumer Credit. Sources: The
Japan Consumer Credit Association, The People’s Bank of China.
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neoliberal thought in Japan. However, the revised Money Lending Law, which was
enacted in December 2006 to protect consumers from excessive profit-making by consu-
mer lenders, destroyed the consumer lending industry. Outstanding non-bank consumer
credit plummeted from 2005 to 2013 despite some subsequent recovery due to steady
growth in credit card shopping and shopping credit.
In China, the expansion of consumer loans began in 1998 to mitigate the negative
influence of the Asian financial crisis and stimulate domestic demand. The Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) has actively promoted the growth of consumer credit with a shift from
export-led to domestic demand-led growth. In 2009, the China Banking Regulatory Com-
mission (CBRC) issued the Pilot Programme of Consumer Finance Companies and a pilot
project of specialised consumer finance companies. Furthermore, the proliferation of e-
commerce and online financing, promoted by Chinese IT giants (e.g. Alibaba Group,
Tencent, Baidu, JD.com), alongside the rise of financial technology (fintech), including
big data analytics, has also contributed to consumer credit growth. In 2018, China’s
ratio of consumer credit to the GDP (13.2%) exceeded that of Japan (9.0%) but fell
short of the US ratio (19.6%).
Industrious norms were developed in the early modern Japanese agrarian village, and
contemporary Japan has inherited these anti-capitalistic norms. Furthermore, systemic
support has maintained the solidarity within and between Japanese intermediary organ-
isations (e.g. village, company). Although the original, narrow definition of systemic
support is government and bank support for financially strained financial institutions
and companies, its broadened definition incorporates dominant elites/superiors’
support and protection of subordinates in exchange for the latter’s loyalty and obedience
(Gotoh & Sinclair, 2017). In contrast, the market-oriented economy of late imperial China
(1368–1912) was dominated by the emperor and landlords, and feudal production
relations between landlords and peasants can be regarded as the ‘embryo of capitalism’
(Jing & Luo, 1978, p. 218). The weakness of systemic support in the Chinese village and the
power of landlords hampered the formation of anti-capitalistic industrious norms, and the
‘(economic) rationalism underpinning the process of market-formation and state-building
in imperial China’ has long been embedded in Chinese society (Gruin, 2019a, p. 42).
Furthermore, the different timings of Japan and China’s integration into the global
economy and the interests of key actors of each country have also affected their consu-
mer credit development trajectories. The period of a county’s integration into the global
economy is critical because it is influenced by the institutions of the hegemonic power of
the time. Japan was influenced by the US ‘embedded liberalism’ when it was reintegrated
into the global economy during the 1950s. Embedded liberalism and Japan’s strategic
importance for the US during the Cold War tolerated Japan’s economic interventionism
and consolidated the power of anti-liberal elites including conservative politicians of
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), interventionist bureaucrats and bureaucratic
corporate executives of big businesses. However, their interests have been conflicting
with enhanced international capital mobility over the last three decades. In contrast,
China integrated into the global economy during the 1990s, when US neoliberalism
and its institutions affected China’s institutional formation. The Chinese economy had
stagnated during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), and this stagnation spurred the
CCP’s impulse to turn to neoliberal solutions (Harvey, 2005; Weber, 2018). International
organisations, including the World Trading Organization (WTO) and the International
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Monetary Fund (IMF), also encouraged China to conduct neoliberal reforms, but America’s
influence on China was much less direct and intrusive than it was on Japan, which was
occupied by US forces from August 1945 until April 1952. China attracted massive
foreign direct investment inflows, which, along with soaring exports, contributed to
rapid economic growth from the 1990s until the mid-2000s. China has adapted more
easily to enhanced international capital mobility than Japan. Although the CCP has
retained capital controls, their main purpose is to redistribute income from Chinese
workers (depositors) to the corporate sector via financial repression (Vermeiren &
Dierckx, 2012).
I begin by examining the financialization of consumption spreading from the US to
other regions and subsequently explore Japan’s and China’s divergent trajectories in
financialization of consumption. I then discuss the ‘industrious revolution’ in early
modern Japan and economic rationalism in late imperial China and their influences on
contemporary Japanese and Chinese social norms. Finally, I elucidate the reasons for
the divergent trajectories, namely the different social norms, the interests of key actors
of each country, and the different timings of their integration into the global economy.
Financialization and consumer credit
Financialization started with the American economy (Krippner, 2005) and has expanded
into other economies through financial globalization, which can be described as the
growing influence of Anglo-American neoliberal norms and financial practices. Although
the literature on financialization mainly focussed on the supremacy of shareholder value
as a mode of corporate governance, enhanced international capital mobility, the increas-
ing dominance of capital market-based financial institutions, and growing economic
inequality until the first half of the 2000s (e.g. Brenner, 2002; Dore, 2000; Froud et al.,
2000), it later expanded into the Anglo-American consumer credit industry (e.g. Gonzalez,
2015; Langley, 2008 and 2013; Montgomerie, 2006; Rona-Tas & Guseva, 2018).
Non-mortgage consumer credit (including consumer finance, auto loans, sales credit
and credit card cash advances)1 in the US began growing with the rise of mass production
and consumption during the 1920s. It expanded rapidly under Fordism from the late
1940s until the early 1970s, when oil shocks and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system occurred. Fordismwas linked to US socio-economic transformation (Montgomerie,
2006). The proportion of US consumer credit to GDP soared from 3.3% to 12.2% between
1945 and 1970. During this period, capital mobility (capitalist power) was constrained by a
compromise among labour, government and capitalists in industrialised countries
intended to restrict the influence of communism on labour. However, during the 1970s
and 1980s, the rise of neoliberalism dramatically changed the US economic landscape.
Harvey (2005, p. 66) contends neoliberalism advocates for free capital mobility
between sectors, regions, and countries, which suggests capitalist dominance (ibid.:
38). Financialization in the US began in the corporate sector and expanded from there
into the household (consumer) sector. Higher capital mobility in the US and other
English-speaking countries resulted in the ascendancy of capitalist values (shareholder
capitalism), privatisation, sharp increases in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), including
leveraged buyouts, financial disintermediation, and securitisation. Shareholder capitalism
prioritises market efficiency and shareholder returns over social stability and the benefits
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of other stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, and broader society, moving capital
quickly to obtain a higher return on investment. Shareholder capitalism pursues econom-
ies of scale through M&A, uses higher financial leverage (a larger amount of debt to
acquire additional assets) to enhance shareholder value and seeks efficient financing
using capital markets.
In the 1980s and 1990s, US commercial banks witnessed corporate finance for big
business shifting to capital markets and expanded retail finance for consumers and
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Major commercial banks such as Bank of
America, JPMorgan Chase and Citibank have dominated the credit card market, while
the use of information technology has enabled cost-efficient retail transactions (Litan &
Rauch, 1998). The federal government providing student loans is also a major consumer
credit provider, and the contribution of non-banks, including auto finance companies, has
decreased since the global financial crisis. Commercial banks, the government and non-
banks accounted for 42.2%, 30.9% and 13.3% of outstanding US consumer credit, respect-
ively, in 2018. The proportion of outstanding US consumer credit to the GDP further
increased to 19.6% in 2018, which indicates the financialization of not only consumption
but also education. Student loan problems have recently attracted public attention in
Japan and China, but the size of student loans in these countries is much smaller than
in the US.
American-style financialization and its socio-economic model have been disseminated
to other countries but unevenly. The convergence can be witnessed in the Anglosphere,
which comprises culturally close countries with liberal market economies (LMEs) and gen-
erally high proportions of consumer debt to GDP. In contrast, for coordinated market
economies (CMEs) such as France, Germany and Japan, the proportions are lower than
those of LMEs. However, American-style consumerism and financial practices have
been promoted in East Asia, which is culturally different from the Anglosphere, by multi-
national corporations and financial institutions seeking to expand global footprints and
local companies and financial institutions imitating Anglo-American business models.
Urbanisation and housing booms have boosted consumer spending as well. Furthermore,
people from East Asia studying and working in the Anglosphere have distributed neolib-
eral thought and business practices in their home countries.
The literature on the ‘financialization of daily life’ in the US (e.g. Martin, 2002) demon-
strates the connection between social norms/cultures and financialization. Dal Maso
(2020) elucidates how the stock market rise in China is connected to the everyday dimen-
sion of Chinese financialization, while Dore (2000) delineates the Japanese view of finan-
cialization. Dore (2000, p. 8) points out the Japanese regard ‘productivism’ (a culture
geared to serving one’s fellow-citizens by providing goods and services) is ethically
superior to financialization (in his words, ‘a culture of “mere” self-enrichment unlinked
to any concern with the service or disservice one might be doing to one’s fellow-citizens
in the process’). Japanese-style productivism requires both capital and labour for long-
term commitment to specific organisations, and in Japan, this collectivist mindset mili-
tates against an individualist mindset of financialization aiming for the maximisation of
short-term financial profit through high mobility of capital and labour (i.e. capitalist dom-
inance and labour casualisation). Dore (ibid.) claims productivism is one of Japan’s Con-
fucian legacies, but if so, do the Chinese also have productivism? I argue productivism,
closely intertwined with industrious norms, also stemmed from the industrious revolution
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although Japanese elites utilised Confucianism as a tool to promote both productivism
and industrious norms.
Japan’s (de-)financialization of consumption
To analyse its financialization and subsequent de-financialization of consumption, the
characteristics of the postwar Japanese system must first be examined. The ‘1940
system’ developed for total war have remained in Japanese society to date, and they
can be witnessed in the bureaucratic intervention, the bank-centered financial system,
the Japanese-style corporate system, in which both systemic support and in-group
favouritism are deeply embedded, and the prioritisation of producer over consumer inter-
ests (Noguchi, 2010). Japanese banks can be regarded as de facto a half-public and half-
private extension of the economic bureaucracy – Japanese bankers are anti-liberal elites
rather than capitalists unlike their Anglo-American counterparts (Gotoh, 2019). During the
Cold War, systemic support bonding long-termist corporate management, committed
labour and patient capital together, along with the hegemonic support from the US
(e.g. the US accommodative trade policy and dollar-yen exchange rate favourable for
Japanese exporters and generous technology transfer), significantly contributed to
Japan’s sharp economic growth. At that time, Japan’s banking sector prioritised corporate
finance over consumer finance, although the household sector was the largest source of
fundraising.
In 1954, two interest rate laws governing money lending were implemented in Japan:
the Capital Subscription Law (CSL) and the Interest Rate Restriction Law (IRRL). The former
stipulated any lending with interest rates above 109.5% constituted a crime. For non-bank
credit lenders, the latter placed interest rate caps of 15–20% according to the size of loans.
The two laws created a gap between interest rate limits (i.e. ‘grey zone interest rates’).
However, criticism of non-bank consumer lenders for excessive lending, excessively
high interest rates and severe debt collection measures intensified in the late 1970s.
This resulted in the Money Lending Control Law (MLCL) of 1983, which gradually
lowered the cap imposed by the CSL to 29.2% by 2000. One of the MLCL’s conditions
for money lenders (e.g. consumer lenders, credit card, shopping credit and leasing com-
panies) to receive grey zone interest rates was that borrowers paid such interest rates
‘voluntarily’.
The total outstanding amount of consumer credit expanded from ¥20.3 trillion in 1982
to the historical peak of ¥74.8 trillion in 1995. In the 1980s, due to Japan’s lowered stra-
tegic importance for the US and the rise of neoliberalism, the US no longer tolerated
Japan’s interventionism and tried to pry open its financial market. Financial deregulation
and diminished net interest margins for corporate loans, along with the housing/asset
bubble from 1985 to 1991, pushed the banking sector to increase consumer loans dra-
matically. The banking sector accounted for 61.6% of the consumer credit outstanding
in 1995. Between 1982 and 1995, the proportion of outstanding consumer credit to the
GDP soared from 6.6% to 14.5%, which was close to the proportion in the US (14.9%).
These 13 years can be viewed as the financialization of consumption in Japan.
However, because the asset bubble boosted this financialization, it was unsustainable.
After the asset bubble burst from 1991 to 1993, the banking sector’s outstanding consu-
mer credit plummeted from ¥46.1 trillion in 1995 to ¥24.1 trillion in 2005. Consequently,
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overall outstanding consumer credit and the proportion to the GDP plunged to ¥55.5 tril-
lion and 10.5%, respectively, in 2005.
However, the decrease in overall outstanding consumer credit from 1995 to 2005 was
not as sharp as that in bank consumer lending. Non-banks2 such as consumer lenders and,
to a lesser extent, credit card companies rapidly increased consumer credit in the same
period. The rapid non-bank consumer credit expansion was driven by the 1996 Japanese
Big Bang financial deregulation. The outstanding credit of consumer lenders soared from
¥5.2 trillion in 1995 to ¥9.9 trillion in 2005. Consumer lenders providing loans mainly for
non-prime borrowers were less-regulated non-establishments that existed outside typical
Japanese social relations underpinned by systemic support (Gotoh, 2019). Japanese
society traditionally regards personal borrowing as shameful and views lending money
and exploiting borrowers’ weakness as despicable conduct.3 Consumer lenders remained
social outcasts, although they grew sharply after the asset bubble burst. This rapid growth
stemmed from the economic slowdown and increase in low-income workers; technologi-
cal development enabling consumers’ easy access to credit, such as unstaffed automatic
loan-dispenser booths; the significant expansion of TV advertising campaigns for consu-
mer loans; the Japanese Big Bang, which enabled non-banks to tap the capital markets;
and excessive cash in banks, which increased loans to consumer lenders (Kozuka &
Nottage, 2007, pp. 12–3). Large lenders provided additional loans for borrowers up to
their credit ceilings and introduced distressed borrowers to smaller lenders who
imposed higher interest rates to enable them to repay the original debts, which was
called the ‘sweat box’ business model of consumer lending (ibid.: 13). The model
worked in Japan, primarily because bankruptcy is a serious social stigma.
The non-bank consumer credit expansion cooccurred with the rise of neoliberals,
including reformist politicians and bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, neoclassical economists
and businesspeople of foreign firms, and the decline of traditional anti-liberal elites
such as conservative politicians, interventionist bureaucrats, legal elites, bureaucratic cor-
porate executives and local bankers. Thanks to the expansion of non-prime consumer
credit, the founders of the big-four consumer lenders (Takefuji, Acom, Promise and
Aiful) ranked among the wealthiest Japanese entrepreneurs in the early 2000s.
However, there was a sharply rising public concern about millions of struggling bor-
rowers, the severe debt collection measures utilised by consumer lenders, and the associ-
ated suicides of borrowers and their families. The lucrative consumer lending market in
Japan attracted foreign capital, including Citigroup and General Electric Capital, which
acquired second-tier Japanese consumer lenders and formed CitiFinancial Japan (CFJ)
and GE Consumer Finance (GECF), respectively. In 2005, CFJ and GECF were, respectively,
the fifth and sixth largest consumer lenders in Japan. From the mid-1990s to the mid-
2000s, Western financial institutions expanded their Japanese businesses, particularly in
M&A, debt/derivatives trading, consumer credit, securitisation and wealth management,
which illustrated some similarities with Anglo-American style financialization.
In early 2006, the Supreme Court struck a sudden death knell for booming consumer
lenders. The court rulings effectively repudiated the validity of grey zone interest rates by
denying the voluntary nature of borrowers’ payments due to the existence of acceleration
clauses in consumer lenders’ loan documents and made consumer lenders liable for reim-
bursing excess interest charges from the past, as unjust enrichment. In December 2006,
the amendments to the MLCL, which was renamed the Money Lending Law, and
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related laws passed the National Diet, despite opposition from consumer lenders and
internal conflict within the LDP. This reform lowered the interest rate cap imposed by
the CSL to a rate under that of the IRRL (i.e. abolishing grey zone interest rates). The retro-
spective application of the law to past debt was detrimental to consumer lenders, whose
aggregated excess interest reimbursement reached ¥4 trillion, according to the weekly
edition of Toyo Keizai for 26 June 2015. The reform also imposed an ‘Aggregate Debt
Control’ that limited the aggregate amount of loans from consumer lenders to one-
third of a borrower’s gross annual income, which had a catastrophic impact on the con-
sumer lending industry. The 2006 revised Money Lending Law accelerated the de-finan-
cialization of consumption in Japan. The Financial Services Agency (FSA) indicates the
number of ‘legal money lenders’ (e.g. consumer lenders and credit card, shopping
credit and leasing companies with money lending licenses) plummeted from 14,236 in
2005 to 2,113 in 2013, and the outstanding balance of aggregate money lenders for con-
sumers also declined sharply from ¥20.9 trillion to ¥6.2 trillion during the same period.
Due to the enormous excess interest reimbursement burden, Acom and Promise asked
their main creditor banks for rescue and became their subsidiaries, while Aiful received
the support from its creditor banks for debt restructuring. However, Takefuji filed for
bankruptcy in September 2010 due to its lack of a strong relationship with creditor
banks. In September 2008, General Electric Capital sold GECF to Shinsei Bank. Citigroup
drastically shrank the assets of CFJ and withdrew from it in September 2010.
Japan’s consumer credit reform was exceptionally radical, and neoliberals criticised the
excessive government restriction of consumer lending, arguing it did not rescue econ-
omic losers but rather lowered market efficiency and stifled the economy (e.g. Kobayashi,
2009). However, Shigeo Takii, one of the Supreme Court judges who denied the validity of
grey zone interest rates, commented it was unjust that many people had committed
suicide due to extremely high interest rates while consumer lenders earned unprece-
dented profits (Suda, 2010, p. 106). Reform of the consumer lending industry within
the LDP was led by Kaoru Yosano, minister of state for Economic and Fiscal Policy and
Financial Services, and Masuzumi Gotoda, parliamentary secretary of the Cabinet Office.
Yosano stated while the decision on whether the government should let distressed
debtors borrow further or prevent them from borrowing was a matter of philosophy,
he believed the government should prioritise the restriction of excessive lending over
the negative effects of restricting the credit supply on the economy (Ide, 2007, pp.
105–6).
Yoshitake Masuhara (2012), a former Ministry of Finance (MOF) official and LDP poli-
tician, criticised this view as patronising and disrespectful of the public. He stated Japa-
nese politicians are excessively eager to protect the socially vulnerable (e.g. the poor,
the elderly) to obtain votes, creating market inefficiencies and vested interests, while vul-
nerable people lose self-help measures and efforts.4 Conversely, Gotoda stated consumer
lending industry reform was associated with the question of what kind of country Japan
should be, and the safety of households should be the foundation of economic growth,
which was well-received by the media (Ide, 2007, p. 135). The FSA supported drastic
reforms, partly because of its belief that consumer lending should be covered mainly
by banks (ibid.: 77–8). This reform exemplifies Japanese anti-liberal elites’ tendency to
prioritise social stability and protection over the market efficiencies and self-help advo-
cated by Anglo-American style capitalism. I contend the bankruptcies of numerous
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consumer lenders can be ascribed to Japanese society’s backlash to neoliberal norms and
financialization along with systemic support for financially distressed consumers. Further-
more, although the most effective way to rescue distressed debtors is to relieve them of
the fear of bankruptcy as a social stigma, along with providing financial education, this is
likely the last thing Japanese anti-liberal elites want, as they apprehend frequent bank-
ruptcies as indicative of the deterioration of social morality.
Due to the revised Money Lending Law, outstanding consumer credit dropped from
¥55.5 trillion in 2005 to ¥36.4 trillion in 2013. However, it recovered to ¥49.3 trillion in
2018, mainly thanks to the growth in both credit card shopping and shopping credit.
The global financial crisis, which began in 2007, accelerated Japanese society’s distrust
of Anglo-American-style financialization, including the expansion of consumer credit
and asset-backed securities (Sato, 2010). The annual origination amount of asset-
backed securities plunged from the peak of 2006 (¥10 trillion) to the trough of 2010
(¥3 trillion). Most American and European financial institutions and credit rating agencies
have drastically scaled back or withdrawn from their businesses in Japan due to the
diminished financial business environment since the revised Money Lending Law and
the global financial crisis. For instance, HSBC and Citigroup terminated their retail
banking in Japan in June 2012 and November 2015, respectively.
Consumer credit growth in China
In contrast to Japan, the financialization of consumption in China is a recent phenom-
enon. There were three main impediments to China’s non-mortgage consumer credit
growth before 2010: the CCP’s financial repression, the CCP’s tolerance to aggressive
private lending behaviour and the restricted labour mobility. Firstly, the financial repres-
sion allowed the state to extract domestic capital at a lower cost. The underlying rationale
for this policy was prioritising demanders of funds (e.g. corporate borrowers) at the
expense of providers of funds (e.g. depositors). In practice, this was achieved by
capping the deposit interest rate below the expected inflation rate, resulting in a negative
rate of return on deposits. Furthermore, state-owned banks (SOBs) preferred loans for
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) over those for consumers and SMEs owing to the
difficulty in assessing the latter’s creditworthiness (Lin & Sun, 2006). This pushed consu-
mers and SMEs into borrowing from local money lenders, which sometimes resulted in
private loan disputes, including criminal offenses due to illegal and violent methods of
loan collection.
Secondly, the CCP’s tolerance towards aggressive private lending behaviour demon-
strated weak systemic support for the socially vulnerable. In traditional Chinese society,
private loans were regarded as an exploitation of the general public by local authorities
and/or the wealthy. Under the CCP’s rule, predatory private lending behaviour has con-
tinued in contemporary China. China’s judicial law only considers monthly interest
rates that are four times more than the average interest rate provided by banks as
illegal private loan transactions. Consequently, most private loans are extended
between family members and relatives, which has dampened the expansion of local
money lenders.
Lastly, the restricted labour mobility from rural to urban areas discouraged mass con-
sumption. The implementation of the hukou (household registration) system from 1958
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restricted the freedom of movement for people and created a dual economy and society
in China. Under this system, the migration of agricultural (rural) hukou holders to urban
areas was tightly restricted because it could jeopardise agricultural production and
cause overpopulation and political instability in urban areas. Regulations were relaxed
for rural labour to work in cities from the mid-1980s and enabled China to become the
‘world’s factory’. However, this was at the expense of rural hukou holders in urban
areas, who were denied access to public services, such as social housing, education, pen-
sions and employment (Chan, 2009). The limited social security for rural hukou holders in
urban areas, the drastic social security reform from the mid-1980s until the late 1990s and
the restructuring of SOEs from the 1990s onwards demonstrated the weak/weakened sys-
temic support for the socially vulnerable, invoking economic rationalism embedded in
Chinese society.
China’s investment and export-driven growth policy generated the dichotomy of rich
urban and poor rural areas, a growing economic gap between rural and urban hukou
holders, and intense trade friction (particularly with the US). Due to these issues, the
CCP has aimed to shift to consumption-driven growth policy since the aftermath of the
global financial crisis by deregulating and promoting the services sector, including
retail and information technology, developing the consumer credit market and further
relaxing the restriction on rural hukou holders’ migration to urban areas. Such actions
have mitigated the above impediments. China’s shift to the consumption-driven
growth model was demonstrated by Premier Wen’s remarks at the 2009 World Economic
Forum that the purpose of the RMB 4 trillion fiscal stimulus packages was to boost dom-
estic consumer demand. Since then, SOBs have significantly expanded both consumer
credit and loans for consumer credit companies. Consequently, China’s consumer credit
has soared, and its outstanding consumer credit more than quintupled, from RMB 2.1 tril-
lion in 2010 to RMB 12.1 trillion in 2018.
The launch of the CBRC’s Pilot Programme of Consumer Finance Companies in July
2009, the relaxation of the entry standards and operating restrictions in 2013, and Presi-
dent Xi’s emphasis on ‘financial inclusion’ in the 2016 Plan for Promoting the Develop-
ment of Financial Inclusion exemplify China’s commitment to consumer credit market
development. Building social control based on fintech is another incentive for the CCP
to promote consumer credit growth alongside its consumption-led growth policy. For
instance, the comprehensive social credit system announced in 2014 demonstrates the
CCP’s ambition to increase social and economic control via its financial inclusion
agenda. The CCP can achieve this control by utilising the National Credit Information
Sharing Platform (NCISP) to produce a credit scoring system. As Gruin (2019b) points
out, NCISP has accumulated historical credit data from the People’s Bank of China’s
(PBC, the central bank) Credit Reference Centre, transactions of rural customers with
the Postal Savings Bank of China (with the largest branch network) and other information,
such as the daily transactions of individuals (e.g. phone bills, tax payments, criminal
records) drawn from the public sector. Given the depth and scale of this database, the
credit scoring system can allow officials to rate the creditworthiness of individuals and
enterprises, and, in turn, control their access to credit and consumption.5
Further urbanisation, development of China’s shadow banking, and enhanced materi-
alism and conspicuous consumption have also contributed to China’s consumer credit
growth. The proportion of urban residential population to total population in China
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hiked from 47.0% to 59.6% between 2008 and 2018, which boosted mass consumption
through increased per capita income and shifted the industrial structure from manufac-
turing to services. However, the proportion of urban hukou holders to the total population
remained 43.4% in 2018, which means around 30% of urban residents are rural hukou
holders. Most of these rural hukou holders in urban areas have limited access to social
security and earn much lower wages than urban hukou holders. The conversion of their
hukou status from rural to urban would be very costly for provincial governments of
urban areas and employers. Nevertheless, the maltreatment of rural hukou holders in
urban areas as secondary citizens would slow down urbanisation and consumption-
driven growth.
The PBC’s monetary easing after the 2008 crisis led to the development of China’s
shadow banking by commercial banks. Shadow banking has contributed to its consumer
credit growth, given it opened new investment opportunities for households. Retail inves-
tors accounted for 53% of aggregate wealth management product (WMP) funds through
private banking and 36% of the total amount of collective investment trust products in
2016 (Ehlers et al., 2018). Entrusted loans and trust loans with commercial banks
serving as middlemen and peer-to-peer (P2P) loans through online platforms (e.g. Ant
Financial of Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu), which connect demanders and providers of funds,
enabled private firms to acquire corporate finance directly from households (ibid.;
Wang et al., 2015). SOBs take advantage of household investors insofar as increasing
their willingness to purchase their WMPs by giving the false impression that these pro-
ducts are backed by banks and the state (Sun, 2019). The P2P lending industry not only
has online lending platforms, through which money lenders can provide their services,
but is also a hotbed for fraudulent lenders to extort money from investors. The CCP’s
weak investor protection against financial risks for household investors was evident.
The government introduced regulations requiring WMPs to be listed as on-balance-
sheet transactions only in 2018 although it recognised the potential systemic risk of
these transactions.6
Importantly, a crucial domestic development is the rise of consumerism in Chinese
society and people’s increasing acceptance of the use of borrowing for their consump-
tion. This change was exemplified by substantial increases in auto finance penetration
in China, from roughly 20% to 40–50% between 2014 and 2018 (Deloitte, 2016; S&P
Global Ratings, 2019). The increased willingness to utilise auto loans is most evident in
rural households and can be regarded as a form of conspicuous consumption (Zhu &
Xia, 2018). Liao and Wang (2017) emphasise success and happiness in China are judged
by social evaluation rather than Western-style self-evaluation. They contend that ‘in con-
ventional Chinese society, pursuing material success and surpassing others in life and
career are the highest forms of success. The people with the highest wealth and status
often represent the ultimate goal of happiness’ (ibid.: 3).
Social norms and ‘industrious revolution’
The key factor for Japan’s and China’s trajectories in (de-)financialization of consumption
is their diverging social norms, which, alongside their different entry points into the global
economy and the interests of key actors of each country, has shaped consumer credit pol-
icies in the respective countries. Fukuyama (1995) identifies three broad paths to
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sociability based on family and kinship, intermediary organisations outside kinship and
the state, claiming the Japanese rely heavily on the second path while the Chinese
depend on the first and third paths, which reveal their divergent social norms.
I contend Japanese and Chinese societies’ different views of capital-labour relations,
which were mainly attributed to Japan’s ‘industrious revolution’ and China’s embedded
economic rationalism, have contributed to their different consumer credit development
trajectories. Akira Hayami (1992, 2015), an economic historian, argues that during the
Edo period (1603–1868), Japan experienced a labour-intensive, capital-saving path of
agricultural development, industrious revolution, given its scarcity of arable land and
abundance of labour, enhancing living standards and forming modern Japan’s work
ethic and respect for labour. He contrasts this to the Industrial Revolution in the mid-
18th to mid-19th century Britain, which faced much less pressure from a labour
surplus. From the mid-16th century to the early Edo period, the Japanese government
separated samurai warriors/elites, the ruling class, from farmers to establish a standing
army and mitigate the risk of an agrarian revolt by confiscating weapons from farmers.
It also eliminated landlords who had both aspects of samurais and farmers, thereby pro-
moting the independence of small farmers.
These policies removed samurais’ control over farming operations, and the industrious
revolution transformed inefficient, traditional agriculture using peasants in a state of ser-
vitude into highly efficient small-sized farming operations based on better-motivated
family labour, who obtained the profits from increased production yields. A key
mission of feudal lords was to protect the lives of people in their domains (Yonaha,
2014, p. 91). During the Edo period, farmers, who were banned from trading farmland,
accounted for approximately 80% of the total population. The Japanese village was a
membership community that provided vital mutual support for small farmers, while all
members were required to make a full commitment to the village. Occasionally, villages
revolted against tax hikes imposed by the ruler and farmland foreclosure by money
lenders to maintain their autonomy. Systemic support was witnessed within a village
and between samurai elites and farmers in the same domain.
Many Japanese historians (e.g. Saito, 2010; Yonaha, 2014) have accepted Hayami’s
theory. Sugihara (2004, p. 14) claims that ‘the work ethic associated with the Industrious
Revolution path had survived the Meiji Restoration (in 1868) and the Postwar Reform’.
Japanese elites have promoted industrious norms (internalised work ethic, respect for
labour and a negative view of financial profit) and mobilised the workforce to enrich inter-
mediary organisations and the country since the Edo period. However, during the Meiji
period (1868–1912), landlords collecting rents from tenant farmers without working in
their farms, who were called ‘parasite landlords’, re-emerged due to the introduction of
Western-style governance. Although Japan’s liberal economic system from 1868 until
the early 1930s was influenced by the liberal international order of Pax Britannica, agrarian
and labour disputes (i.e. class conflicts) dramatically increased from WWI (1914–18) until
the mid-1930s (Teranishi, 2003, pp. 143–7), which reflected the tension between liberal
global norms and socialistic Japanese social norms. Yonaha (2014) contends Edo Japan
was under ‘feudal socialism’ segmented by village, whereas wartime Japan was under
socialism led by military and bureaucracy.
After WWII, the US occupation forces, initially led by the New Dealers, eliminated
major Japanese capitalists, including landlords and executives of Zaibatsu
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conglomerates and large firms, through the agricultural land reform, the dissolution of
Zaibatsu, the purge of top management and the wealth tax. This greatly contributed to
the maintenance of socialistic industrious norms in postwar Japan, making a coalition of
anti-liberal management and labour against capitalists (mainly shareholders pursuing
short-term profit) at large firms (Matsumoto, 2011; Nishiyama, 1992; Noguchi, 2010).
Despite the decline in the proportion of the agricultural population to the entire
labour population from over 60% to 6% between 1900 and 2000 through urbanisation,
industrious norms have been instilled into both public-sector organisations and private-
sector companies, which share similarities with agrarian villages during the Edo period.
Postwar Japanese companies, rather than the state, have provided a large proportion of
social welfare (albeit declining over the last two decades) for their employees. Brinton
(2011) and Nakane (1973) claim the Japanese traditionally have a strong attachment to
‘ba (social location)’ shared by a small group (e.g. village, company division, bureau),
which results in stronger social solidarity than an attachment to an entire organisation
or the state, with belonging to a small group a prerequisite for participating in a large
group.
Nishiyama (1992, p. 246) points out large Japanese firms are not dominated by share-
holders but by managers (as supervisory workers) and claims the postwar decline of capi-
talists and the dominance of firms by supervisory workers in Japan was based on an idea
that only people who provide labour should be rewarded, while those who do not are
unqualified for a reward. However, over the last three decades, an increasing number
of low-paid, easily dischargeable non-regular workers have neither obtained full member-
ship to social location nor been sufficiently rewarded. This suggests the Japanese motiv-
ation for industriousness is weakening. Hayami (2015, p. 95) claims ‘the Japanese people
are likely witnessing the end of a 400-year era of industriousness’, but industrious norms
are still persisting in Japan as anti-liberal elites tenaciously try to preserve the norms
which are closely linked to their vested interests. While some scholars (e.g. Hayashi,
2020; Shibata, 2020) claim neoliberal corporate management has casualized the employ-
ment in Japan, I contend most Japanese corporate management have anti-liberal bureau-
cratic (not capitalistic) characteristics and have hired low-paid, easily dischargeable non-
regular workers to reduce personnel costs and protect existing regular workers in lifetime
employment. However, although labour is respected in Japan, I agree the exploitation of
non-regular workers has been aggravated in the prolonged economic stagnation.
In summary, the Japanese have long maintained strong attachments to intermediary
organisations that are intertwined with anti-capitalistic industrious norms and systemic
support. The solidarity within and between Japanese intermediary organisations is
demonstrated in the behaviour of both superiors and subordinates (e.g. village leaders
and members, corporate executives and regular workers, large firms and subcontractors)
mutually abandoning their alternative options to long-term commitment. Although
industrious norms and systemic support in Japan have both become weaker over the
last three decades, they still characterise Japanese society and intermediary organisations
by constraining the mobility of capital and labour and resisting capitalist dominance.
In contrast, intermediary organisations (e.g. village, company) between the state and
family have played a limited role in providing systemic support in China. The Song
dynasty (960–1279) replaced the power of aristocrats under the hereditary system with
that of the autocratic emperor and his scholar-bureaucrats selected by the civil service
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examinations (keju) system (Naito, 2004). According to Jing and Luo (1978), Lufrano (1997)
and Miyakawa (1955), under autocracy, political power was highly centralised, while the
social and economic system was liberalised (e.g. freedom of movement and occupational
choice, the development of monetary economy, the diffusion of markets). The centralised
autocratic-bureaucratic system intensified economic competition in Chinese society and
continued until the collapse of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Scholar-bureaucrats, as the
exercisers of imperial power, landlords and monopolisers of knowledge, exerted domi-
nance over ordinary people.
The sense of paternalistic obligation between lord and peasant did not exist in China
(Fukuyama, 1995). For survival, people turned to the clan (extended family), which is a
patrilineal group of related individuals with a common surname sharing a common ances-
tor, and clan-based organisations provided a safety net for members. Kinship ties were
more important in imperial China than in early modern Japan. In imperial China, equal
inheritance among males was widely accepted, while primogeniture was the norm in
Japan, where many non-eldest sons had to seek protection outside their family.
Chinese people maintained their lifetime membership to a clan regardless of relocation
(even overseas) and marriage, whereas in Japan, relocation and marriage often invali-
dated a family membership given the emphasis on social location (Shang, 1998). The
elevation of family bonds above all other social loyalties in China hampered the
growth of intermediary organisations (Fukuyama, 1995). Instead, Chinese people relied
on guanxi7 outside kinship, which plays a key role in Chinese capitalism (for an expla-
nation of guanxi capitalism, see McNally, 2011).
Zhan (2019) argues, from 1700 to 1820, China also experienced the industrious revolu-
tion, which was ascribed to peasant rebellions and wars during the Ming–Qing transition
(1618–96) that eliminated many landlords, the equal inheritance among males that frag-
mented farmlands and the Qing state’s policy of supporting small farmers to preserve
agrarian taxes as a major state revenue. Although small farmers were still subordinated
to landlords and elites, they gained some autonomy, and their social status improved.
Arrighi (2007) also refers to the industrious revolution, although he emphasises the con-
vergence of the two countries’ development paths. The Qing state adopted a market-
based economy mainly supported by a massive agricultural surplus but gave up an
income redistribution function. However, in the late 18th century, the industrious revolu-
tion started to unravel. The living standards of small farmers seriously deteriorated due to
the Qing state’s heavy reliance on local elites (scholar-bureaucrats and landlords) regard-
ing local governance and the extraordinary population growth, which shifted the balance
of power in favour of landlords (i.e. increased taxes levied on farmers) owing to the
increased scarcity and value of land (Zhan, 2019). Importantly, there exists significant con-
tinuity between the nature (economic rationalism) of the market economy that devel-
oped in Qing China and the emergence of China’s current capitalism (Gruin, 2019a, p. 31).
The industrious revolution in China enhanced the industriousness of farmers and agri-
cultural productivity for 120 years but succumbed to capitalist power and did not embed
anti-capitalistic industrious norm (particularly respect for labour) in society due to the
weakness of systemic support within intermediary organisations (e.g. village) and
between social classes. Moore (1966, p. 208) states that ‘The Chinese village… evidently
lacked cohesiveness in comparison with those in India, Japan, and even many parts of
Europe. There were far fewer occasions on which numerous members of the village
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cooperated in a common task in a way that creates the habits and sentiments of solidar-
ity’. The dominance of villages by landlords and the limited constraints on farmers trading
farmland and moving to other villages hampered the cohesiveness of the Chinese village
and the formation of industrious norms in villages and broader society.
Between 1947 and 1951, the CCP eliminated landlords and introduced the hukou
system, destroying the market economy. In 1951, the party started providing people
with ‘iron rice bowl’ (cradle-to-grave) social security through SOEs and agricultural collec-
tives (subsequently developed into communes), which was strong systemic support. The
early postwar period witnessed some similarities between Japan and China. However,
from 1958 until 1962, the CCP launched the Great Leap Forward, an economic and
social campaign to reconstruct the Chinese economy through the formation of
people’s communes. Collectivisation (ban on private holdings) was unpopular among
farmers, and a lack of effective coordination and supervision caused an extraordinary
famine (Zhan, 2019). The Great Leap Forward can be regarded as a top-down attempt
at an industrious revolution by using abundant labour that failed to form anti-capitalistic
industrious norms in socialist China.
In summary, the Chinese do not traditionally rely on systemic support within and
between intermediary organisations; instead, they turn to kinship and guanxi networks.
Meanwhile, capitalist dominance under autocracy and economic rationalism have
remained deep-seated in Chinese society since the era of imperial China. During the
reign of Mao Zedong, systemic support in China was temporarily strengthened but has
become weakened since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms. In today’s China, systemic
support is narrow andmainly confined to kinship and relations between central/local gov-
ernments and SOEs.
Reasons for the divergent paths in (de-)financialization of consumption
I contend Japan’s and China’s divergent paths in financialization of consumption can be
attributed to the varying levels of compatibility between American financial norms (max-
imisation of short-term financial profit through high mobility of capital and labour) and
their social norms, the different timings of their integration into the global economy,
and the interests of key actors of each country. The actual process of institutional for-
mation is a combination of the socio-historical and external influences. Embedded liberal-
ism and the US hegemonic support during the Cold War enabled anti-liberal elites to
maintain dominant status in Japan under the 1940 system, and these elites promoted
industrious norms and systemic support to mobilise society for economic development.
However, anti-liberal elites’ vested interest, industrious norms, strong attachments to
social location and systemic support hampered Japanese society’s adaptation to
enhanced capital mobility and financialization. For anti-liberal elites, unrestricted capital-
ist power is a threat to their dominant status. In contrast, the dramatic expansion of
China’s consumer credit over the last decade has been promoted by the CCP’s consump-
tion-driven economic growth policy to maintain its legitimacy of the rule and economic
rationalism embedded in Chinese society.
Japan’s rapid consumer credit expansion from 1982 until 1995 was driven by the first
wave of financial globalization, which forced Japanese banks to expand consumer finance
to make up for decreased profitability in corporate finance. Further, both domestic
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pressure (mainly from export-oriented industries) to stop the appreciation of the yen
against the US dollar and US pressure on Japan to stimulate the global economy
through domestic demand expansion at the Louvre Accord in 1987 caused the Bank of
Japan’s (BOJ’s) drastic monetary easing, which generated an enormous asset bubble.
This bubble, which promoted luxury consumption, speculative property and financial
investment, and consumer credit, generated the financialization of consumption.
However, it created tensions between the haves (e.g. property owners, speculative inves-
tors) and the have-nots. A series of monetary tightening measures by the BOJ from May
1989 until August 1990, alongside MOF’s introduction of the restriction on the total
amounts of loans for real estate in March 1990, ultimately burst the asset bubble. This
was a key distant cause to reverse the financialization of consumption.
I argue these bubble-bursting measures, which were encouraged by the have-nots
(ordinary workers) and mass media critical of skyrocketing property prices and growing
economic inequality (Nishimura, 1999), exhibited anti-liberal elites’ hostility towards
financialization that would erode industrious norms and systemic support. These elites
utilised industrious norms, which view pursuing short-term financial profit as immoral,
to contain financialization. However, the damage to the Japanese financial system
caused when the asset bubble burst was much larger than most Japanese leaders had
expected, resulting in banks’ drastic reduction of consumer credit from the mid-1990s
onwards to meet the Basel Capital Accord.
However, non-banks’ rapid consumer credit expansion in Japan was accelerated by the
second wave of financial globalization. The prolonged bad debt problem and economic
slump caused Japanese elites to lose confidence in their traditional financial system and
introduce Anglo-American style financial practices. The power of anti-liberal elites and
systemic support weakened in Japan while Anglo-American financial practices gathered
momentum in Japan between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, when economic inequality
became conspicuous. Before the bubble burst and the LDP fell in the early 1990s, anti-
liberal elites had provided systemic support as quasi-public goods, which directly and
indirectly protected the great majority of Japanese people while maintaining relatively
high economic growth (Gotoh, 2019). In the mid-2000s, systemic support resurged due
to the public call for stability, but the relative power decline of anti-liberal elites has trans-
formed systemic support to virtual subsidies to specific interest groups. Japanese poli-
ticians have been keen to support the socially vulnerable (interest groups), who have
sought support from the government, to gather more votes. Such diluted systemic
support included the revised Money Lending Law, which coincided with other anti-neo-
liberal backlash events starting in 2006 (e.g. the Livedoor and Murakami Fund incidents),
accelerating the de-financialization of consumption (Gotoh, 2020).
Early modern Japan resisted the ethos of imperial China (from the Song dynasty
onwards), which was maximising capital and labour mobility by removing fixed inter-
mediary organisations considerably under autocracy (Yonaha, 2014). Despite its ideologi-
cal difference from the West, Chinese society had long experienced a market economy
without relying heavily on systemic support outside family and kinship. However,
under Mao’s rule, the CCP boosted systemic support by restricting capitalist power and
labour mobility through the elimination of landlords, the introduction of the hukou
system and the establishment of SOEs and people’s communes, which could not be
sustained.
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After the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), the CCP emphasised economic
growth as an indicator of success and as a means of legitimacy (Breslin, 2007, p. 26). The
stagnation of the Chinese economy during the revolution motivated the CCP’s impulse to
carry out economic liberalisation reforms (Weber, 2018). Since the announcement of the
‘reform and opening-up’ in 1978, the CCP has gradually enhanced the mobility of capital
and labour, which is not new to Chinese society and has been facilitated by invoked econ-
omic rationalism. The CCP abolished the people’s communes by the winter of 1982–3 and
loosened the restrictions on both migrations from rural areas to smaller cities and rural-
urban hukou conversion. In his 1986 interview with Deng Xiaoping, American reporter
Mike Wallace stated ‘To get rich is glorious. That declaration by Chinese leaders to their
people surprises many in the capitalist world’. Deng did not object this statement and
replied ‘to get rich is no sin’ (USC US–China Institute). The CCP drastically reformed the
social security system from the mid-1980s until the late 1990s, turning to neoliberal sol-
utions to restructure SOEs through sweeping job cuts, bankruptcy, consolidation and pri-
vatisation since the 1990s, reducing systemic support to improve economic efficiency.
This reduction in systemic support has evoked the economic rationalism embedded in
Chinese society.
The liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment, privatisation, increases in private
sector companies, and competition between provincial governments for economic per-
formance have gradually increased capital mobility in China. The influence of neoliberal-
ism on China can also be seen in its accession to the WTO (in 2001) and the IMF’s
surveillance mechanisms to encourage financial liberalisation. However, one major differ-
ence from the US is that the Chinese state as a shareholder and institutional investor in
the economy has played a central role in financialization (Wang, 2015). Although many
scholars claim that the CCP’s capital and exchange rate controls deviate from neoliberal
dictates (e.g. Liew, 2005; Strange, 2011), the aim of these controls is to redistribute wealth
from Chinese workers to SOEs and SOBs –the party’s key interests– via financial repression
(Vermeiren & Dierckx, 2012). Importantly, the common goal of both economic rationalism
in Chinese society and neoliberalism is to accumulate capitalist wealth through labour
exploitation by drastically reducing systemic support.
Rapid urbanisation and economic liberalisation have sharply increased mass consump-
tion and consumer credit. According to a survey of more than 16,000 adults in 20
countries conducted by the French market research company Ipsos (2013), 71% of
Chinese respondents agreed with the statement ‘I measure my success by the things I
own’, far higher than those from other countries, including Japan at 22%. The ongoing
consumption-driven growth policy with consumer credit expansion is vital for the
CCP’s legitimacy so that even if the number of consumer credit borrowers victimised
by lenders increases, the party would not change the policy easily.
Conclusion
I have argued Japan’s and China’s diverging trajectories in (de-)financialization of con-
sumption have been predicated on their different social norms, which are linked to
their different entry points into the global economy and the interests of key actors of
each country (Table 1). Japanese society’s anti-capitalistic industrious norms, which
have been underpinned by strong systemic support within and among intermediary
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organisations, are at odds with financialization and Anglo-American financial norms that
enhance both capital and labour mobility, leading to capitalist dominance and labour
casualisation. In contrast, economic rationalism embedded in Chinese society, which
drives people to increase material wealth through kinship and guanxi networks, has facili-
tated financialization of consumption. Chinese society does not have strong attachments
to social location (membership to intermediary organisations) and industrious norms/pro-
ductivism (a negative view of financial profit), which hamper market efficiency and
financialization.
As the comparative analysis of early modern Japan and late imperial China indicates,
the formation of social norms requires a very long time, and once formed, social norms
are persistent. However, there is no such thing as constant norms in a society, and
social norms change through interactions with domestic and international factors. For
instance, in early modern Japan, ruling elites pursued long-term stability in their
domains (social location) through compromise with farmers by providing autonomy for
and instilling industrious norms into them rather than short-term benefit by coercing
them to pay heavier taxes. Social norms do not exist indigenously, but they are used
by dominant elites as a tool. Industrious norms and systemic support are cornerstones
of anti-liberal elites’ dominance in Japan. Now that around four centuries have passed
since the industrious revolution, the Japanese motivation for industriousness is fading
although anti-liberal elites adamantly try to maintain industrious norms and systemic
support to protect their dominant status from a capitalist threat. Furthermore, Japan’s
resistance to financialization has caused the country to pay a series of painful tolls,
such as prolonged weak consumer spending, economic hollowing-out (due to Japanese
firms’ soaring overseas investment) and sharp rises in the number of working poor. In con-
trast, although China experienced the industrious revolution between 1700 and 1820 as
well as an attempt at a top-down industrious revolution during Mao’s reign, it was ulti-
mately overwhelmed by capitalist power; consequently, industrious norms were not
encapsulated in Chinese society. The Chinese rely on kinship and guanxi networks due
to relatively weak systemic support within and between intermediary organisations.
Today’s ‘neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics’ (Harvey, 2005) could be regarded as
a revival of the combination of economic rationalism and autocracy during late imperial
China. China’s better compatibility with financialization and Anglo-American-style capit-
alism has contributed to its rapid economic growth. Still, growing economic inequality
between wealthy urban residents and poor farmers remains a serious political issue.
The problems in Japan and China would change the two societies’ norms.
Table 1. Comparison in (De-)Financialization of Consumption between Japan and China.
Social Norms
Timing of Integration to




















This article has highlighted the significant influence socio-historical factors have had
on both the Japanese and Chinese paths in (de-)financialization of consumption, which
differ from the Anglo-American ‘model’. Other forms of financialization (and resistance
to it) in Japan and China can be witnessed in areas such as corporate governance,
capital market regulation, and de-industrialization. Furthermore, my analytical approach
focusing on social norms, which were nurtured in social relations over farmland (e.g.
between feudal lords, landlords and farmers) during the early modern agrarian era and
have survived today, can be applied to other countries in Asia and Europe.
Notes
1. Although in some literature consumer credit includes mortgages, my paper focuses on non-
mortgage consumer credit for two reasons. Firstly, non-mortgage consumer credit influences
consumer spending, while residential mortgages affect housing investment. Secondly, in
industrialized countries, when households take out a mortgage, they may receive public
support (e.g. government guarantees and low-interest rate loans from government
financial institutions), unlike non-mortgage consumer credit.
2. Many Japanese non-mortgage, consumer credit non-banks were established during the
1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, in the 1960s, American credit cards, including Diners Club,
American Express and Mastercard, entered Japan mainly through alliances with Japanese
banks, and local Japanese credit cards were also established.
3. Interview with Professor Yoshio Shima at Tamagawa University, 31 July 2019.
4. Interview, 23 November 2015.
5. The CCP’s attempt to use fintech as a method of control is supported by technology giants in
China, including Tencent, which has been accused of facilitating government censorship and
surveillance by drawing data from its two social media applications, WeChat and QQ.
6. Furthermore, not only were there no capital requirements for participating in P2P lending
transactions but also there was no regulatory authority to monitor these lenders’ actions
and protect fund providers (Tsai 2015; Wang et al., 2015) until the consolidation of the
CBRC and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) in 2018.
7. According to McNally (2011, p. 2), ‘Guanxi denotes the establishment of long-term reciprocal
personal relationships that can create enduring trust. Guanxi thus can facilitate business
relations and collaborative ties among entrepreneurs.’
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Shaun Breslin, Hugh Whittaker, Yu-wai Vic Li and Chieh-Chi Hsieh for
their invaluable help on previous versions of this paper. Also, the author is grateful to the two anon-
ymous reviwers whose comments helped improve the paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributor
Fumihito Gotoh is a Teaching and Research Fellow in the Department of Politics and International
Studies at the University of Warwick. His research expertise includes East Asian politics, International
Political Economy, comparative capitalisms, globalization and resistance, and credit markets and
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 19
credit rating agencies. His monograph, Japanese Resistance to American Financial Hegemony: Global
versus Domestic Social Norms, was published in the Routledge RIPE Series in Global Political
Economy in October 2019. His articles have appeared in Review of International Political Economy
and The Pacific Review. Previously, he was a senior credit research analyst for the Industrial Bank
of Japan, Merrill Lynch and UBS.
References
Arrighi, G. (2007). Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineage of the twenty-first century. Verso.
Brenner, R. (2002). The boom and the bubble: The US in the World economy. Verso.
Breslin, S. (2007). China and the global political economy. Palgrave Macmillan.
Brinton, M. C. (2011). Lost in Japan: Youth, work, and instability and postindustrial Japan. Cambridge
University Press.
Chan, K. W. (2009). The Chinese Hukou system at 50. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 50(2), 197–
221. https://doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.50.2.197
Dal Maso, G. (2020). Risky expertise in Chinese financialisation: Returned labour and the state-finance
nexus. Palgrave Macmillan.
Deloitte, (2016). 2015 China auto finance report.
Dore, R. (2000). Stock market capitalism: Welfare capitalism: Japan and Germany versus the Anglo-
Saxons. Oxford University Press.
Ehlers, T., Kong, S., & Zhu, F. (2018). ‘Mapping Shadow Banking in China: Structure and Dynamics’ BIS
Working Papers, No. 701.
Epstein, G. A., (Ed). (2005). Financialization and the World economy. Edward Elgar.
Froud, J., Haslam, C., Johal, S., & Williams, K. (2000). Shareholder value and financialization:
Consultancy promise, management moves. Economy and Society, 29(1), 80–110. https://doi.
org/10.1080/030851400360578
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity. Free Press.
Gonzalez, F. (2015). Where are the consumers? “Real households” and the financialization of con-
sumption. Cultural Studies, 29(5–6), 781–806. https://doi.org/10.1080/09502386.2015.1017144
Gotoh, F. (2019). Japanese resistance to American financial hegemony: Global versus domestic social
norms. Routledge.
Gotoh, F. (2020). Industrial associations as ideational platforms: Why Japan resisted American-style
shareholder capitalism. The Pacific Review, 33(1), 125–152. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.
2018.1557245
Gotoh, F., & Sinclair, T. J. (2017). Social norms strike back: Why American financial practices failed in
Japan. Review of International Political Economy, 24(6), 1030–1051. https://doi.org/10.1080/
09692290.2017.1381983
Gruin, J. (2019a). Communists constructing capitalism: State, market, and the party in China’s financial
reform. Manchester University Press.
Gruin, J. (2019b). Financializing authoritarian capitalism: Chinese fintech and the institutional foun-
dations of algorithmic governance. Finance and Society, 5(2), 84–104. https://doi.org/10.2218/
finsoc.v5i2.4135
Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press.
Hayami, A. (1992). The industrious revolution. Look Japan, 38(436), 8–10.
Hayami, A. (2015). Japan’s industrious revolution: Economic and social transformations in the early
modern period. Springer.
Hayashi, M. (2020). Democracy Against Labor Movement: Japan’s Anti-Labor Developmental State
and Aftermaths. Critical Sociology, advance online publication. https://0-journals-sagepub-com.
pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/doi/full/10.1177/0896920520921216
Ide, S. (2007). Sarakin hokai (The collapse of the Japanese consumer credit industry). Hayakawa
Publishing.
Ipsos. (2013). Global Attitudes on Materialism, Finances and Family. Retrieved June 2020, from
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/news_and_polls/2013-12/6359.pdf
20 F. GOTOH
Japan Consumer Credit Association. Consumer Credit-Related Information. Retrieved June 2020,
from クレジット関連資料 | 一般社団法人日本クレジット協会 (j-credit.or.jp).
Jing, S., & Luo, L. (1978). Landlord and labor in late imperial China: Cases of shandong. Harvard
University Press.
Kobayashi, M. (2009). ‘Kasenai’ Kinyu (Finance ‘that Cannot Lend’). Kadokawa.
Kozuka, S., & Nottage, L. (2007). Re-regulating unsecured consumer credit in Japan: Over-indebted
borrowers, the supreme court, and new legislation. Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research
Paper, 07/62.
Krippner, G. R. (2005). The financialization of the American economy. Socio-Economic Review, 3(2),
173–208. https://doi.org/10.1093/SER/mwi008
Langley, P. (2008). Financialization and the consumer credit boom. Competition & Change, 12(2),
133–147. https://doi.org/10.1179/102452908X289794
Langley, P. (2013). Consuming credit. Consumption Markets & Culture, 17(5), 417–428. https://doi.
org/10.1080/10253866.2013.849594
Liao, J., & Wang, L. (2017). The structure of the Chinese material value scale: An Eastern cultural view.
Frontiers on Psychology, 8(1852), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01852
Liew, L. (2005). ‘China’s engagement with neoliberalism: Path dependency, geography and party
self-reinvention’. The Journal of Development Studies, 41(2), 331–352. https://doi.org/10.1080/
0022038042000309278
Lin, Y. F., & Sun, X. (2006). Information, informal finance, and SME financing. Frontiers in Economics in
China, 1(1), 69–82. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11459-005-0010-1
Litan, R. E., & Rauch, J. (1998). American finance for the 21st century. Brookings Institution Press.
Lufrano, R. J. (1997). Honorable merchants: Commerce and self-cultivation in late imperial China.
University of Hawai’i Press.
Martin, R. (2002). Financialization of daily life. Temple University Press.
Masuhara, Y. (2012). “Jakusha” ha Naze Sukuwarenainoka: Kashikin-gyoho Kaisei ni Miru Seiji no
Shippai (Why the “Vulnerable” Cannot be rescued: Political failure in Japan’s revised money
lending law). Kinzai Institute for Financial Affairs.
Matsumoto, K. (2011). The rise of the Japanese corporate system. Routledge.
McNally, C. A. (2011). China’s changing Guanxi capitalism: Private entrepreneurs between leninist
control and relentless accumulation. Business and Politics, 13(2), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.2202/
1469-3569.1339
Miyakawa, H. (1955). An outline of the naito hypothesis and Its effects on Japanese studies of China.
Far Eastern Quarterly, 14(4), 533–552. https://doi.org/10.2307/2941835
Montgomerie, J. (2006). The financialization of the American credit card industry. Competition &
Change, 10(3), 301–319. https://doi.org/10.1179/102452906X114393
Moore, B. (1966). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasants in the making of
modern world. Beacon Press.
Naito, K. (2004). Toyo-bunka-shi (Oriental cultural history). Chuokoron-Shinsha.
Nakane, C. (1973). Japanese society. Penguin Books.
Nishimura, Y. (1999). Kin’yu Gyosei no Hai’in (Why financial authority lost). Bungeishunju.
Nishiyama, T. (1992). Nippon Kigyo-ron (A Study on the Japanese company). Bunshindo.
Noguchi, Y. (2010). 1940 nen Taisei: Saraba “Senji Keizai” Zohoban (The 1940 system: Farewell to
“Wartime Economy” – Enlarged edition). Toyo Keizai.
People’s Bank of China ‘Statistics’ available at Data (pbc.gov.cn) (accessed in May 2020).
Petry, J. (2020). Financialization with chinese characteristics? Exchanges, control and capital markets
in authoritarian capitalism. Economy and Society, advance online publication. https://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03085147.2020.1718913
Rethel, L., & Thurbon, E. (2020). Introduction: Finance, development and the state in East Asia. New
Political Economy, 25(3), 315–319. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2018.1562435
Robinson, G. (2017). Pragmatic financialization: The role of the Japanese post office. New Political
Economy, 22(1), 61–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2016.1195347
Rona-Tas, A., & Guseva, A. (2018). Consumer credit in comparative perspective. Annual Review of
Sociology, 44(1), 55–75. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-060116-053653
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 21
Saito, O. (2010). An industrious revolution in an East Asian market economy? Tokugawa Japan and
implications for the great divergence&. Australian Economic History Review, 50(3), 240–261.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8446.2010.00304.x
Sato, T. (2010). Kinyu Gyosei no Zahyojiku: Heiji to Yuji wo Koete (Criteria of financial administration:
Beyond peacetime and contingency). Toyo Keizai.
Shang, H. P. (1998). Chinese and Japanese: a comparative study of social groups, behavioural patterns
and cultural psychology. Peking University Press.
S&P Global Ratings. (2019). An Overview of China’s Auto Finance Market and Auto Loan Securitization.
Shibata, S. (2020). Contesting precarity in Japan: The rise of non-regular workers and the new policy
dissensus, Ithaca. Cornell University Press.
Strange, G. (2011). China’s Post-Listian rise: Beyond radical globalization theory and the political
economy of neoliberal hegemony. New Political Economy, 16(5), 539–559. https://doi.org/10.
1080/13563467.2011.536210
Suda, S. (2010). Sarakin senmetsu (The annihilation of Japanese consumer credit companies).
Takarajimasha.
Sugihara, K. (2004). ‘The State and the Industrious Revolution in Tokugawa Japan’, LSE Working
Paper, 02/04.
Sun, G. (2019). ‘China’s Shadow Banking: Bank’s Shadow and Traditional Shadow Banking’ BIS
Working Papers, No. 822.
Teranishi, J. (2003). Nippon no Keizai Shisutemu (The Japanese economic system). Iwanami Shoten.
Tsai, K. S. (2015). ‘Financing Small and Medium Enterprises in China: Recent Trends and Prospects
Beyond Shadow Banking’, HKUST IEMS Working Paper No. 2015–24.
USC US-China Institute. Deng Xiaoping, “Interview with Mike Wallace of 60 min,” Sept. 2, 1986 | US-
China Institute (accessed February 2021).
Vermeiren, M., & Dierckx, S. (2012). Challenging global neoliberalism? The global political economy
of China’s capital controls. Third World Quarterly, 33(9), 1647–1668. https://doi.org/10.1080/
01436597.2012.720841
Volkswagen Finance. (2015). China auto finance consumer behaviour report 2014–2015.
Wang, G., Zeng, G., & Xiaoying, X. Eds. (2017). Development of consumer finance in East Asia. Palgrave
Macmillan.
Wang, H., Chen, K., Zhu, W., & Song, Z. (2015). A process model on P2P lending. Financial Innovation,
1(3), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-015-0002-9
Wang, Y. (2015). The rise of “shareholding state”: Financialization of economic management in
China. Socio-Economic Review, 13(3), 603–625. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwv016
Wang, Z. (2006). Explaining regime strength in China. China: An International Journal, 4(2), 217–237.
https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219747206000124
Weber, I. M. (2018). China and neoliberalism: Moving beyond the China is/is not neoliberal dichot-
omy. In D. Cahill, M. Cooper, M. Konings, & D. Primrose (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of neoliberalism
(pp. 219–33). Sage Publications.
Wen, J. (2009). Strengthen Confidence and Work Together for A New Round of World Economic
Growth. Retrieved June 2020, from http://chicago.china-consulate.org/eng/sw/t534419.htm
Yonaha, J. (2014). Chugoku-ka-suru Nippon, Zohoban (chinalizing Japan, enlarged edition).
Bungeishunju.
Zhan, S. (2019). The land question in China: Agrarian capitalism, industrious revolution, and East Asian
development. Routledge.
Zhu, W., & Xia, Y. (2018). An analysis on household consumption-fueled borrowing in China. Journal
of Finance and Economics, 44(10), 67–81. https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2018.10.005
22 F. GOTOH
